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 Anticipatory breach of contract and the 
necessity of adequate assurance under 
English law and Uniform Commercial Code 
 Reza Beheshti * 
 The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract originated in English law and was 
adopted into the Uniform Commercial Code. The doctrine remained intact and 
rigid in English law but certain rules were modifi ed in the UCC regime, which 
supplemented it by introducing the novel doctrine of adequate assurance, which is 
absent from English law. This article explores whether English law should undergo 
a legislative reform to introduce the doctrine of adequate assurance. One hypothesis 
that will be examined is that adequate assurance is a logical corollary to the doctrine 
of anticipatory breach of contract, being necessary to secure the full benefi t of the 
latter. The decision in The Pro Victor  is investigated: a party made a request for 
confi rmation of performance and the other party’s failure to provide constituted 
a renunciation—perhaps the fi rst recognition by an English court of the adequate 
assurance doctrine. Doctrines in English law that may have similar functions to 
adequate assurance (eg, stoppage in transit, which carries with it a modifi cation 
of contract and exerts pressure on the insolvent buyer to assure the seller about his 
performance) are examined in order to assess whether adequate assurance fi ts well 
into English commercial law. It is suggested that the doctrine of adequate assurance 
should formally be introduced as a new section in the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract, which originated in English law, holds that 
a breach occurs if a promisor, prior to the time at which he is bound to perform a contract, 
expresses an intention to break it, or acts in such a way as to lead a reasonable person 
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Professor Sarah Dromgoole, Professor Mark Gergen and Dr Sean Thomas for their comments on earlier drafts of 
this article. I would also like to thank the anonymous referee who commented on an early draft and who offered 
a number of very valuable comments and insights. I am particularly grateful to the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative and International Private Law for providing me with the funding and the opportunity to use their 
rich library in order to complete this article. The usual disclaimer applies.
 The following abbreviations are used: 
 Benjamin : MG Bridge (ed),  Benjamin’s Sale of Goods , 10th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2017); 
 Chitty : HG Beale (ed),  Chitty on Contracts , 14th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015); 
 Goode : E McKendrick (ed),  Goode on Commercial Law , 5th edn (Penguin Books, London, 2010); 
 Liu : Q Liu,  Anticipatory Breach (Hart Publishing 2011) 
 Treitel : WE Peel,  Treitel: The Law of Contract , 14th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015).
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to conclude that he does not intend to fulfi l his obligation.  1  This type of breach, called 
anticipatory breach, entitles the promisee to exercise contractual remedies, even though 
the time for performance has not yet arrived. Anticipatory breach did not remain confi ned 
to English law, having been adopted into the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) § 2-609. 
This regime modifi ed certain rules of the doctrine, which remained intact and rigid in 
English law, and supplemented it by introducing the doctrine of adequate assurance. This 
doctrine stipulates that, in blurred circumstances, an insecure party, either seller or buyer, 
can demand adequate assurance from the other party that the contractual obligations will 
be performed.  2  Until the request is answered, the insecure party may withhold its own 
performance and, if the request is answered unsatisfactorily, the insecure party may hold 
the other in breach. The notion of adequate assurance, which is absent from English law, 
was introduced by Karl Llewellyn into the UCC.  3  
 The central enquiry is whether English law should adopt the doctrine of adequate 
assurance. First, this article will provide general background to the doctrine of anticipatory 
breach under English law. Second, the doctrine of adequate assurance will be introduced 
and explained. The article will subsequently examine the necessity of this doctrine 
with reference to the principle of certainty and the mitigation policy. In particular, one 
hypothesis that will be explored is that adequate assurance is a logical corollary to the 
doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract, being necessary to secure the full benefi t of 
the latter. Finally, the article will evaluate whether this doctrine can be transplanted into 
English law and will assess the objections that may arise from this legal regime. 
 II. GENERAL BACKGROUND TO ANTICIPATORY 
BREACH UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
 Anticipatory breach of contract is a notion which was fi rst coherently prescribed in 
terms of legal principles in  Hochster v De la Tour  4  in England and  Howie v Anderson  5  in 
Scotland. An anticipatory breach of contract emerges when the promisor renounces the 
contract or disables itself from performing his obligations before the time for performance 
arrives.  6  “A renunciation of a contract occurs when one party, by words or conduct, evinces 
an intention not to perform, or expressly declares that he is or will be unable to perform 
his obligations under the contract in some essential respect”.  7  The promisor may have 
 1 .  Hochster v De La Tour (1853) 2 E & B 678; 118 ER 922.  
 2 .  S Vogenauer and J Kleinheisterkamp,  Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (PICC) (OUP 2009), 370. 
 3 .  LT Garvin, “Adequate assurance of performance: of risk, duress and cognition” (1998) 69 UCLR 71, 71. 
See also TM Campbell, “The right to assurance of performance under § UCC 2-609: toward a uniform rule of 
contract law” (1982) 5 FLR 1292. 
 4 .  (1853) 2 E & B 678; 118 ER 922. 
 5 .  (1848) 10 D 355. 
 6 .  Benjamin , [12.021];  Chitty , [24.022]; GH Treitel,  Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Account (OUP, 1988), 379; S Rowan,  Remedies for Breach of Contract, A Comparative Analysis of Protection of 
Performance (OUP, 2012), 75; R Bradgate and F White, “Rejection and termination in contracts for the sale of 
goods”, in J Birds, R Bradgate and C Villiers,  Termination of Contracts (John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 20. 
 7 .  Chitty , [24.018]. See also  Treitel , [17.074];  Benjamin , [12.019];  Mersey Steel and Iron Co Ltd v Naylor, 
Benzon & Co (1884) 9 App Cas 434;  Bradley v H Newsom Sons & Co [1919] AC 16;  Brinkibon v Stahag Stahl 
und Stahlwarenhandels GmbH  [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 556 (CA). 
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behaved in such a way that the promisee, on the balance of probabilities, could have drawn 
an inference that the promisor is likely to commit a breach when the time for performance 
arrives.  8  In  Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co ,  9  the court ruled that the previous 
conduct of the promisor in failing to fulfi l another related contract is likely to lead to the 
inference that he will fail to perform the contract in question. However, in  The Hermosa ,  10  
the Court of Appeal ruled that the claimant’s termination was unjustifi ed, “not because 
the breach which [the claimant] anticipated was insubstantial, but because the conduct of 
[the defendant] did not justify a fi rm inference that there would be a further breach”. The 
criterion of a fundamental breach should also be satisfi ed, signifying that the promisee 
can exercise its right to terminate a contract only when the breach is suffi ciently serious.  11  
 When the promisee infers that prospective fundamental breach will occur, he has 
two choices thereafter. The fi rst choice is to affi rm the contract despite the professed 
repudiation, thereby keeping the contract alive, and continue to press for performance.  12  
Another choice is to accept the renunciation, which has the following impacts: (i) to entitle 
the promisee to bring the contract to an end, thereby being discharged from that time 
onward from further performance; (ii) to allow the promisee to claim damages at once, 
without waiting for the time set for performance;  13  (iii) to bring forward the promisee’s 
duty to mitigate to the time when anticipatory breach was accepted.  14  An anticipatory 
breach of contract therefore entitles the promisee to exercise appropriate contractual 
remedies, including termination of contract, even though the time for performance has not 
yet arrived.  15  The reason(s) for this striking entitlement is not entirely clear and the scant 
scholarly materials have failed to provide precise explanations. 
 There are two major legal reasons justifying this striking entitlement. First, the “inferential 
breach theory” explains that, when the promisor, prior to the day of performance, evinces 
an intention probably indicating the occurrence of a fundamental breach of the contract 
in future, there is no reason to keep the contract alive.  16  The major justifi cation for such 
termination lies in an economically effi cient response that English contract law provides 
by allowing the parties escape from the motions of performing a contract that is dead for 
practical purposes, thereby encouraging mitigation of losses.  17  Shortly before  Hochster , 
in the important case of  Warburton v Storr ,  18  Abbott CJ stated that it is an established 
 8 .  Johnstone v Milling (1886) 16 QBD 460 (CA), 467. See also  Chitty , [24.023]. 
 9 .  [2002] EWCA Civ 889;  [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 436 . 
 10 .  Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp v Pansuiza Cie de Navigacion SA (The Hermosa)  [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 570 , 
580. 
 11 .  Afovos Shipping Co SA v R Pagnan & Fratelli (The Afovos)  [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 335 ; [1983] 1 WLR 195 
(HL). See also  Fleming & Wendeln GmbH & Co v Sanofi  SA/AG [2003] EWHC 561 (Comm);  [2003] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 473 ;  Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada (CI) Ltd [1986] AC 207;  Liu , [70–71]; JW Carter, 
 Carter’s Breach of Contract (Hart, 2012), 318. 
 12 .  Treitel , [17.079]; A Burrows (ed),  English Private Law , 3rd edn (OUP, 2013), 600–601. 
 13 .  Synge v Synge [1894] 1 QB 466;  Lep Air Services Ltd v Rolloswin Investments Ltd [1973] AC 331, 356. 
 14 .  Hochster v De la Tour (1853) 2 E & B 678;  Chitty , [24.24]. 
 15 .  Chitty , [17.081]. 
 16 .  Hochster v De la Tour (1853) 2 E & B 678, 688. 
 17 .  Bunge SA v Nidera BV [2015] UKSC 43;  [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 469 ; [2015] Bus LR 987, [12]. See also 
N Andrews, M Clarke, A Tettenborn and G Virgo,  Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination and 
Remedies , 2nd edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2017), 123. 
 18 .  (1825) 4 B&C 103, 106; 107 ER 997, 998. See also Q Liu, “Inferring Future Breach: Towards a 
Unifying Test of Anticipatory Breach of Contract” (2007) 66 CLJ 574; M Mustill, “The Golden Victory—Some 
Refl ections” (2008) 124 LQR 569, 571–572. 
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rule of law that “if a party covenants to do a certain thing, and afterwards, by his own act, 
disables [itself] from performing it, that is in itself a breach of the covenant”. The rationale 
for entitling the promisee to treat the contract as at an end before the time for performance 
is the reasonable inference of the inevitability of non-performance.  19  The “eventual non-
performance” can, by anticipation, “be treated as a cause of action” for the availability of 
remedies.  20  In other words, what holds sway is not what has already occurred but what is 
likely to occur. The promisee is allowed to predict on the basis of the promisor’s conduct 
that a breach will inevitably happen and thereby he is not bound to wait until it actually 
happens.  21  As a result, anticipatory breach means that the promisor is in breach from the 
moment that the future breach becomes inevitable. It must then follow that the anticipated 
breach is of exactly the same character as the breach which would actually have happened 
if the promisee had waited.  22  Although there may be scenarios where there is an absolute 
certainty about future breaches, it seems diffi cult and somewhat implausible to predict 
accurately the nature and character of those breaches. Indeed, an anticipated breach is still 
not a certain, unequivocal breach, as the promisor may, prior to the day fi xed for fulfi lling 
the act, put itself in a situation to perform the contract. The promisor may, for example, 
repurchase the goods so as to be in a situation to sell and deliver them to the promisee. 
Nevertheless, this theory has played a key role in explaining and justifying the promisee’s 
entitlement to remedies due to an anticipatory breach of contract.  23  
 Another reason lies in the “implied promise” theory that took a dominant role for a 
considerable period after  Hochster .  24  This theory, which originally emerged in  Elderton 
v Emmens  25  concerning a contract of personal service, suggests that a contract involves 
mutual covenants embracing an implied promise that neither party will repudiate its 
duties.  26  Although  Elderton was concerned with an employment case, Lord Campbell 
CJ in  Hochster undertook the bold step of extending the implied promise theory into 
a general doctrine being applicable to every type of contract.  27  In modern employment 
cases, this implied promise is usually translated to envisage that confi dence and trust ought 
to be preserved between the parties.  28  According to this theory, a contract constitutes a 
relationship between the parties. The parties are under an obligation to hold themselves 
willing and able to perform; and, in the period between formation and performance of 
 19 .  Geden Operations Ltd v Dry Bulk Handy Holdings Inc, M/V (The Bulk Uruguay) [2014] EWHC 885 
(Comm);  [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 66 . See also  STX Mumbai v STX Mumbai [2015] SGCA 35;  [2016] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 157 . 
 20 .  Frost v Knight (1872) LR 7 Ex 111 (Ex Ch), 112–113. 
 21 .  Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277 (HL). See also 
 Johnstone v Milling (1886) LR 16 QBD 460. 
 22 .  Thorpe v Fasey [1949] Ch 649. 
 23 .  English courts have used this theory in explaining the promisee’s striking entitlement in these cases: 
 Mersey Steel and Iron Co Ltd v Naylor, Benzon & Co (1882) 9 QBD 648;  Maple Flock Co Ltd v  Universal 
Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd. [1934] 1 KB 148;  Decro-Wall v Practitioners [1971] 1 WLR 361;  Gunton 
v  Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council [1981] Ch 448;  Shyam Jewellers Ltd v  Cheeseman [2001] 
EWCA Civ 1818. 
 24 .  Liu, [32]; Goode, 139. See also  Elderton v Emmens (1853) 4 HL Cas 624; 10 ER 606. 
 25 .  Ibid . 
 26 .  Hochster (1853) 2 E & B 678, 682. 
 27 .  Hochster (1853) 2 E & B 678, 688. See also  Guy-Pell v Foster [1930] 2 Ch 169 (CA). 
 28 .  British Aircraft Corp v Austin [1978] IRLR 332;  Post Offi ce v Roberts [1980] IRLR 347;  Malik v Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 20;  Morrow v Safeway Stores Ltd [2001] EmpLR 1303. 
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the contract, they impliedly promise that neither will do anything inconsistent with that 
relationship. If such an implied undertaking is breached, the promisee has the option to 
act upon such a breach and avail itself of a recession of the contract as an immediate right 
of action as well as sue for damages. Although this theory appears to be more persuasive 
than the previous one, as it more accurately explains the causal link between the present 
breach for an existing obligation and the immediate right to appropriate remedies, Lord 
Campbell CJ in  Hochster failed to spell out clearly the legal basis for the implication of 
the promise to preserve the contractual relationship in every type of contract. Additionally, 
with the modernisation of the implication of promises and in particular the arrival of the 
“business effi cacy” test,  29  the “implied promise” theory quickly dissipated.  30  However, this 
paper does not aim to scrutinise these reasons further. 
 Notwithstanding the reasons underlying the promisee’s entitlement to remedies prior to 
the time for performance of a contract, anticipatory breach can be a trap. A promisee may 
misconstrue signals from an ostensibly underperforming promisor as repudiation. Also, 
the promisor may manifest highly ambiguous and frequently inconsistent expressions, 
raising doubts as to whether it will perform the contract. This would create a dubious and 
uncertain situation for the promisee. The doctrine of anticipatory breach, as it currently 
stands in English contract law, fails effectively to rescue a promisee who faces uncertain 
circumstances. A comparative investigation shows that UCC and CISG,  31  proving 
themselves to be more realistic, modifi ed certain rules of this doctrine which have remained 
rigid in English law.  32  The former legal regimes supplemented the doctrine by introducing 
the obligee’s right to demand adequate assurance that the contractual obligations will be 
fulfi lled. The rest of this paper strives to provide a response to the normative question of 
whether the right to demand adequate assurance should be introduced into English law. 
 III. THE DOCTRINE OF ADEQUATE ASSURANCE: 
DEFINITION AND BACKGROUND 
 The notion of adequate assurance was one of the innovations that drafters introduced into 
the UCC.  33  Llewellyn, who led the drafters, believed that law is an instrument to achieve 
social ends which needs to be constantly assessed in terms of its purpose and its effect 
to realise whether it fi ts the society it purports to serve.  34  In this regard, Llewellyn, as 
a legal realist, espoused the approach of considering how the law actually functions by 
 29 .  The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 (CA). 
 30 .  Liu, [33]. 
 31 .  UN (Vienna) Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980. 
 32 .  M Vanwikck-Alexandre, “Anticipatory Breach and Instalment Contracts in the CISG” [2001] IBLJ 
353, 355. 
 33 .  See generally LT Garvin, “Adequate Assurance of Performance: of Risk, Duress and Cognition” (1998) 
69 UCLR 71; TM Campbell, “The Right to Assurance of Performance under UCC § 2-609: Toward a Uniform 
Rule of Contract Law” (1982) 5 FLR 1292; GS Crespi, “The Adequate Assurance Doctrine after UCC § 2-609: 
A Test of the Effi ciency of the Common Law” (1993) 38 VLR 179. 
 34 .  K Llewellyn,  The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Little Brown, 1960), 122; K Llewellyn, 
“Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound” (1931) 44 HLR 1222, 1265; K Llewellyn, “Why We 
Need the Uniform Commercial Code” (1957) 10 UFLR 367; WD Malcolm, “The Proposed Commercial Code” 
(1951) 6 BLJ 113, 126. 
 ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT 281
setting goals and devising laws to accomplish these goals, and then monitoring the success 
of the legislation.  35  As part of his innovations, he endeavoured to design a set of rules 
which took group practices and their prevailing norms as its central principle. Merchants, 
in Llewellyn’s view, were different from, for example, “housewives, farmers and mere 
lawyers”.  36  The presumption was that the considerations present in a commercial context 
were distinct from those in a non-commercial context, thus demanding unique treatment 
for each. Perhaps this was so because the merchants bore responsibilities imposed by 
explicit law and by case law, which were different from those for lay people.  37  He thought 
that merchants are normally reluctant to adopt commercial rules into their contracts and 
that there was a need to create a law that is more widely used by merchants.  38  Also, he 
was aware that legal rules could be functional only if they were clear, thereby enabling 
merchants to achieve certainty in commercial contracts. In statements before the New York 
Revision Commission, he argued that Art.2 would “produce intelligent and workable 
commercial law”, and would render commercial law and practice “clear, sane and safe”.  39  
Llewellyn, therefore, attempted to craft a body of sales laws accommodating the goal of 
certainty. 
 As part of his attempt to modernise and modify the law of sales, Llewellyn introduced 
the doctrine of adequate assurance into the Uniform Commercial Code. This doctrine 
represents Llewellyn’s attempt to create certain and properly adjusted rules for commercial 
transactions. He was very keen on designing rules which could deal with commercial 
parties in troubled times.  40  As already explained, the doctrine of anticipatory breach 
of contract may lead to diffi cult and blurred situations for promisees, especially when 
promisors behave inconsistently.  41  These promisees required a mechanism by which 
such blurred situations would be crystallised, thus enabling them to make decisions with 
suffi cient confi dence. Adequate assurance is likely to address this legitimate concern of 
promisees by obliging promisors to confi rm future fulfi lment of their contractual duty. 
 35 .  AR Kamp, “Between-the-wars social thought: Karl Llewellyn, legal realism, and the Uniform Commercial 
Code in context” (1995) 59 ALR 325, 339; see also W Twining,  Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), 316. 
 36 .  State of New York Law Revision Committee Report,  Hearing on the Uniform Commercial Code (1954), 
108. See also J Whitman, “Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for 
the Uniform Commercial Code” (1987) 97 YLJ 156, 163. 
 37 .  H Kripke, “The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code” (1962) UILR 321, 
331; see also W Hawkland, “Uniform Commercial Code Methodology” (1962) UILR 291, 295. 
 38 .  IM Hillinger, “The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, 
the Beautiful in Commercial Law” (1985) Boston College Law School Faculty Paper 1163. 
 39 .  State of New York Law Revision Committee Report,  Hearing on the Uniform Commercial Code (1954), 
113; see also S Williston, “The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code” (1950) 63 HLR 561, 
572; Whitman (1987) 97 YLJ 156, 162. 
 40 .  UCC, Art.2 contains the following provisions designed particularly for merchants: § 2-103(l)(b) (good 
faith); § 2-201(2) (statute of frauds “between merchants”); § 2-205 (fi rm offer); § 2-207(2) (additional terms 
in acceptance “between merchants”); § 2-209(2) (modifi cation, rescission and waiver “between merchants”); 
§ 2-312(3) (warranty of title and against infringement); § 2-314(1) (implied warranty of merchantability); 
§ 2-327(l)(c) (sale on approval); § 2-402(2) (rights of seller’s creditors); § 2-403(2) (entrusting);§ 2-509(3) (risk 
of loss); § 2-603(1) (rightful rejection); § 2-605(l)(b) (waiver of buyer’s objections by failure to particularise); 
and § 2-609(2) (adequate assurance of performance). 
 41 .  Ante , text between fnn 29–33. 
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 The right to adequate assurance was fi rst prescribed in UCC § 2-609, which states: 
 “(1)  A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other’s expectation of receiving 
due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with 
respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate assurance 
of due performance and until he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable 
suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return. 
 (2)  Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any 
assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial standards. 
 (3)  Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice the aggrieved party’s right 
to demand assurance of future performance. 
 (4)  After receipt of a justifi ed demand failure to provide within a reasonable time not exceeding 
thirty days such assurance of due performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the 
particular case is a repudiation of the contract.” 
 This article highlights the importance of “a continuing sense of reliance and security that 
the promised performance will be forthcoming”.  42  To protect this interest, the promisee is 
entitled to demand adequate assurance of performance when there are reasonable grounds 
for insecurity regarding the other party’s willingness or ability to perform. Adequate 
assurance is considered a form of self-help and thus a non-judicial mechanism.  43  It 
prescribes the promisee’s immediate reaction to a perceived problem, which would make 
it unnecessary to resort to judicial remedies or third-party intervention.  44  After demanding 
an assurance, the promisee is entitled to suspend its performance. If reasonably adequate 
assurance is not received, the promisee has strong grounds to treat the failure to provide 
assurance as a material breach justifying termination of contract. 
 Although the wording used in the UCC for describing this doctrine is somewhat self-
explanatory, there are a number of vague terms that require explanation. It can be argued 
that the major sources of uncertainty in § 2-609 are the terms of “adequate assurance” 
and “reasonable grounds for insecurity”. Unfortunately, the UCC has provided no clear 
guideline for interpreting them, although the offi cial commentary has striven to clarify 
these obscure terms.  45  The drafters of the UCC intended commercial or business standards 
to be applicable.  46  This may indicate that the UCC requires an objective factual basis to 
assess the adequacy or inadequacy of assurance, just as for the determination of reasonable 
grounds for insecurity, suggesting that courts should follow common sense and reasonable 
business practices, which are varied in different scenarios. 
 42 .  UCC Offi cial Comment n.1 to § 2-609. CISG Art.72 (2) has worded the doctrine of adequate assurance in 
a similar manner to UCC§ 2-609, which reads: “(1) If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear 
that one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare the contract 
avoided.(2) If time allows, the party intending to declare the contract avoided must give reasonable notice to the 
other party in order to permit him to provide adequate assurance of his performance.” 
 43 .  MJ Borden, “The Promissory Character of Adequate Assurances of Performance”  (2010) 76 BLR 167 , 
206; see also MW Sargis, “The Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-609: a Return to Certainty” (1980) 14 
JMLR 113, 120; MP Gergen, “A Theory of Self-help Remedies in Contract” (2009) 89 BULR 1397, 1447. 
 44 .  D Harris and D Campbell and R Halson,  Remedies in Contract and Tort , 2nd edn (Butterworths LexisNexis, 
2002), 62; also DI Brandon, “Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary 
American Society” (1984) 37 VLR 845. 
 45 .  UCC Offi cial Comments. 
 46 .  PR Tepper,  The Law of Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code , 3rd edn (Cengage Learning, 2014), 452. 
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 It seems uncertain and diffi cult for the promisee to fi gure out what reasonable grounds 
constitute suffi cient insecurity to allow him to demand an adequate assurance. To realise 
whether there are reasonable grounds for insecurity, many factors, including the promisor’s 
exact words or conduct, the course of dealing or performance between the parties involved, 
and the nature of the industry should all be taken into account.  47  Insolvency is perhaps 
the most signifi cant cause of insecurity. For instance, in the American case of  Atwood-
Kellogg v Nickeson Farms ,  48  farmers entered into a contract to sell corn and soybeans to 
Farmers Elevator Company of Eden (FEC). Atwood-Kellogg provided fi nancing to FEC 
and maintained a security interest in FEC’s accounts receivables and contract rights. After 
concluding the contract, FEC fell into serious fi nancial diffi culties and became insolvent. 
FEC’s insolvency was undisputed by the parties. Although it was clear that the buyer 
was unable to fulfi l his contract duties, the farmers requested adequate assurance that 
the fi nance company would pay them the specifi ed amount. The fi nance company could 
not provide suffi cient documentation showing adequate assurance of future payment by 
the buyer, and therefore the farmers repudiated the entire contract. In the similar case 
of  Wells v Hartford ,  49  the buyer faced fi nancial diffi culties and fell into arrears on its 
payment under a supply contract. As a result, he asked the seller to slow down and stop 
its shipments; shortly after, the buyer was placed into receivership. It was argued that the 
seller was likely to have “a suspicion amounting to a fi rm belief on its part” that the buyer 
would not perform its obligations.  50  However, suspicion and belief are not substitutes for 
the certainties required to infer a probable prospective breach, and therefore repudiation of 
contract by the seller was not justifi ed. In this situation, the seller was absolutely entitled to 
demand from the buyer a guarantee of payment. Other case law illustrations of reasonable 
foundations for insecurity include: a seller who withheld producing the machines to be 
delivered under the contract,  51  goods similar to those contracted for by other buyers are 
delivered but fail to work as anticipated,  52  and where the seller announces that the contract 
price is too low to guarantee the fulfi lment of his obligation.  53  
 To examine what constitutes an adequate assurance, regard should be given to the 
minimum kinds of promises or acts on the part of the promisor that would satisfy a 
reasonable merchant in the position of the promisee that his expectation of receiving due 
performance will be fulfi lled.  54  Thus, the key factor for determining the adequacy of an 
 47 .  UCC Offi cial Comment n.2 to § 2-609; see also Garvin (1998) 69 UCLR 71, 102; MW Sargis, “The 
Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-609: a Return to Certainty” (1980) 14 JMLR 113, 124. 
 48 .  (1999) 602 NW 2d 749. See also  Universal Builders Corp v United Methodist Convalescent Homes Inc 
(1986) 7 Conn App 318; 508 A 2d 819; 1 UCC 2d 763;  Validsa, Inc v PDVSA Services Inc (2011) 424 Fed 
Appx 862. 
 49 .  (1903) 76 Conn 27; 55 Atl 599. See also  Corn Products Refi ning Co v Fasola (1920) NJL 181; 109 A 505; 
 Slaughter v Barnett (1934) 154 So 134. 
 50 .  (1903) 76 Conn 27; 55 Atl 599, 612. 
 51 .  AMF Inc v McDonald’s Corp (1976) 536 F 2d 1167, 1170: the prototype cash register did not perform 
adequately during one-year trial, and the seller then stopped producing manufacturing the remaining machines. 
 52 .  Creusot-Loire International Inc v Coppus Engineering Corp (1983) 585 F Supp 45: the court confi rmed 
that the buyer of precision parts has reasonable grounds for insecurity when he learns that his seller is conducting 
defective deliveries of such parts to other buyers with similar needs. 
 53 .  Kaiser-Francis Oil Co v Producer’s Gas Co (1989) 870 F 2d 563; 8 UCC2d 1048 : the seller had clearly 
reasonable grounds for insecurity as a matter of law, since the buyer of natural gas explicitly failed to carry on 
performing unless the seller agreed to modify “take-or-pay” provision. 
 54 .  UCC Offi cial Comment, n.4 to § 2-609. See also  By-Lo Oil Co Inc v Partech Inc (2001) 11 Fed Appx 538. 
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assurance is whether the assurance given by the promisor in light of all the circumstances 
can resolve the promisee’s suspicion about future performance such that he would resume 
fulfi lling his contractual duties.  55  The promisee’s satisfaction must, however, be based 
“upon reason and must not be arbitrary or capricious”.  56  This doctrine also begs for 
something that the promisor would not otherwise be obliged to provide, something which 
is not contractually agreed by the parties.  57  An adequate assurance is wide-ranging, and 
could comprise a mere promise to perform or could entail the provision of a guarantee 
bond. It is not unreasonable if the promisee demands “an extension of contractual 
guarantee” or “the posting of a letter of credit” in light of the circumstances.  58  In  Louisiana 
Power & Light Co v Allegheny Ludlum Industries Inc ,  59  the parties had known each other 
through the course of dealings for about fi ve years, and, when a suspicion arose as to 
whether the supplier would fulfi l his duties following a change of circumstances, the buyer 
demanded written assurances that the supplier would fully and properly perform as stated 
under the contract. This was deemed by the court to be an adequate assurance. However, 
in most cases a reasonable demand may extend to a guarantee. For example, in  Hornell 
Brewing Co In v Spry ,  60  the distributor failed to provide documentation of the factoring 
agreement, giving rise to a reasonable ground for the supplier’s insecurity regarding 
whether payment would be forthcoming. The supplier then demanded a documented line 
of credit or similarly powerful guarantee as a form of adequate assurance, which in the 
court’s view was reasonable. The promisee should, however, be cautious when demanding 
assurance, because, if the assurances sought are more than “adequate” and the other party 
rejects to accede to the excessive demands, the court may rule that the promisee itself was 
in repudiatory breach, thus entitling the other party to terminate the contract.  61  
 IV. THE NECESSITY OF ADEQUATE ASSURANCE 
 An important goal of the law governing contractual remedies is broadly to satisfy 
commercial needs and expectations.  62  However, the diffi culty of deciding what those 
expectations actually are and exploring what laws best fi t their needs should not be 
 55 .  Sargis (1980) 14 JMLR 113, 135. See also TM Quinn,  Quinn’s Uniform Commercial Code, Commentary 
and Law Digest , 2nd edn (Thomson Reuters, 2009), 430. 
 56 .  Richmond  Leasing Co v Capital Bank, NA (1985) 762 F 2d 1303, 1309; see also  Cinicola v Scharffenberger 
(2001) 248 F 3d 110, 120. 
 57 .  JJ White and RS Summers,  Uniform Commercial Code , 5th edn (West Group, 2000), 198–199–200; 
see also  Pittsburgh- Des Moines Steel Co v Brookhaven Manor Water Co (1976) 532 F 2d 572, 18 UCC 931; 
 Creusot-Loire International, Inc v Copus Eng’g Corp (1983) 585 F Supp 45, 39 UCC 186. 
 58 .  Creusot-Loire International Inc v Coppus Engineering Corp (1983) 585 F Supp 39, 45; see also  American 
Bronze Corp v Streamway Products (1982) 8 Ohio App 3d 223. 
 59 .  (1981) 517 F Supp 1319; see also  Norcon Power Partners LP v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp (1998) 92 
NY 2d 458. 
 60 .  (1997) 174 Misc 2d 451; see also  State v Pellegrino (1998) 39, 577 NW 2d 590;  Carolina Consulting 
Corp v Ajax Paving Industries, Inc of Florida (2012) 86 So 3d 502;  Carolina Consulting Corp v Ajax Paving 
Industries, Inc of Florida (2012) 86 So 3d 502. 
 61 .  JJ White and RS Summers,  Uniform Commercial Code , 5th edn (West Group, 2000), 199. See also  Erwin 
Weller Co v Talon Inc (1980) 295 NW 2d 172. 
 62 .  See generally G Cuniberti, “The International Market for Contracts, the Most Attractive Contract Laws” 
(2014) 34 NJILB 455. 
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underestimated. Commercial parties enjoy the freedom of choosing which law should 
apply to their contracts. It is therefore possible for them to opt out of the general law of 
contract of a legal system. The more the law of contract departs from what commercial 
parties want, the more likely they are to opt out of it altogether.  63  The law of remedies, 
which falls short of fulfi lling parties’ expectations, plays a key role in the exclusion of 
the entire law of contract of a legal system. In a global and competitive marketplace for 
laws, parties are free to prefer and opt for the law of any jurisdiction that satisfi es their 
preferences over one that does not. A signifi cant factor which is likely at least partly to 
satisfy parties’ expectations is the degree to which the law of contractual remedies is 
certain and predictable. It has been argued that “certainty … is the most indispensable 
quality of mercantile contracts”.  64  This is because the commercial parties “must be able 
to do business with confi dence in the legal results of their actions”.  65  For instance, it is 
believed the reason for the disproportionate attraction of New York law for commercial 
contracts within the USA in comparison with Californian law is that the former contains 
more hard-edged and formal principles than the contextual and all-things-considered 
principles of the latter.  66  The formalist approach offers more certainty, since it strictly 
seeks to enforce the contract’s agreed-upon terms by relying on the plain meaning rules of 
interpretation. On this basis, the law of anticipatory breach of contract as an instance of the 
law of remedies needs to be precisely prescribed in order to provide defi nite scope for the 
injured party’s rights and duties in situations where there is the potential for prospective 
non-performance of contracts. 
 In light of the necessity of legal certainty sketched in this Part, one hypothesis that 
should be examined is that adequate assurance is a logical corollary of the doctrine of 
anticipatory breach of contract.  67  An important requirement for utilising the doctrine of 
anticipatory breach is that a purported repudiation be done with utmost clarity.  68  The 
promisee should demonstrate that the refusal to perform was distinct, unequivocal and 
absolute. These elements are necessary for constituting a valid cause of action. A serious 
repudiation can be easily identifi ed by a promisee who confronts situations where a 
promisor clearly indicates his future non-performance. The promisor may do this either 
by making a defi nite statement indicating that he will not or cannot substantially fulfi l his 
contractual duties or by acting in such a way as to render the performance of the contract 
obligations out of his abilities. In such circumstances, anticipatory breach effectively 
protects the promisee by entitling him to invoke appropriate remedies. 
 Complications begin when the promisor exhibits inconsistent behaviours that place 
the promisee in an ambiguous situation. Promisors, who do not aim to breach but are 
 63 .  See generally L Bernstein, “Merchant Law in a Modern Economy”, in G Letsas and G Klass,  The 
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (OUP, 2014); S Macaulay, “Non-contractual Relations in Business: 
a Preliminary Study” (1963) 28 ASR 55. 
 64 .  Bunge v Tradax [1981] 1 WLR 711, 715;  [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 , 5. See also JH Merryman, “On the 
convergence (and divergence) of the civil law and the common law” (1981) 17 SJIL 357; EA Farnsworth, 
“Developing international trade law” (1979) 9 CWILJ 461. 
 65 .  Bunge v Tradax [1981] 1 WLR 711, 720;  [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 , 9. See also JR Maxeiner, “Legal 
certainty: A European alternative to American legal indeterminacy” (2007) 15 TJICL 541, 549. 
 66 .  GP Miller, “Bargains bicoastal: New light on contract theory” (2010) 31 CLR 1475. 
 67 .  Crespi (1993) 38 VLR 179,181. 
 68 .  Liu,11. 
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unable to fulfi l, may often convey thoroughly vague signals. This may occur when, for 
example, the promisor has become insolvent, or when it fails to perform other contracts 
comparable with the one concluded with the promisee. For instance, in the American 
case of  Hornell Brewing Co v Spry ,  69  the distributor’s failure to sell even a small fraction 
of the product led the supplier to have reasonable doubts about the distributor’s ability 
to perform in the future. In this case, the distributor declined expressly to manifest his 
intention or ability not to perform the contract, thereby putting the promisee in an uncertain 
circumstance. Such an anticipatory breach hence places the promisee, who has perceived 
an apparent repudiation, in a diffi cult dilemma and hence at serious risk. If the promisee 
terminates the contract and sues for breach on the basis of the apparent repudiation, it 
is at risk of being found to have breached the contract itself if the court rules that the 
repudiation was not suffi ciently clear to constitute an anticipatory breach. Not only is this 
unfair to the promisee, but it would lead to economic ineffi ciency. The reason is that, if 
the promisee wrongly decides that repudiation has occurred and terminates the contract, 
any subsequent performance by the promisor fulfi lled before the promisor becomes aware 
of the promisee’s decision may be partially or wholly wasted.  70  This is exactly what 
happened in the English case of  Gulf Agri Trade FZCO v Aston Agro Industrial AG .  71  In 
this case, the seller had to ship 6,000 metric tonnes of Russian Feed Barley during the 
period 10 August to 10 October 2004. The seller had made no shipment by the end of 
September 2004. The buyer therefore decided to declare notice of default to the seller on 
4 October, demanding an “amicable settlement in order to close this fi le”.  72  In this notice, 
the buyer stated that they considered the contract as defaulted and claimed an amount 
to be paid as compensation. Because the seller failed to purport any action showing his 
willingness or ability to perform the contract by the end of September, the buyer assumed 
that it would be impossible for the seller to ship the goods in a timely manner in accordance 
with the contractual arrangements. The buyer thus took action on the basis of an apparent 
repudiation of contract. However, it seems clear that when the buyer gave notice of default 
to the seller, as a matter of fact, the buyer could not have been reasonably certain that 
the seller “could not or would not perform the contract”.  73  The notice of termination was 
therefore held to be premature and thus unjustifi ed, which convinced the GAFTA Appeal 
Board to rule that “[the buyer] could not reasonably have concluded that [the seller] 
were in anticipatory breach of the contract through impossibility or renunciation”.  74  If 
the doctrine of adequate assurance was formally recognised and prescribed in English 
contract law, the buyer with reasonable doubts could demand confi rmation that contractual 
performance will be rendered by the seller. The buyer in the aforementioned case relied 
on the seller’s contractual undertakings, expected to receive those goods and, as such, they 
entered into contract with a number of sub-buyers. Because the seller failed to execute his 
obligations, the buyer had to pay damages for losses incurred to his sub-buyers. Having 
 69 .  (1997) 174 Misc 2d 451; 664 NYS 2d 698. 
 70 .  Crespi (1993) 38 VLR 179, 183; D DeNooyer, “Remedying Anticipatory Repudiation- Past, Present, and 
Future” (1999) 52 SMU Law Review 1787, 1790. 
 71 .  [2008] EWHC 1252 (Comm); [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 991. See also  Fleming & Wendeln GmbH & Co 
v Sanofi  Sa [2003] EWHC 561 (Comm);  [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 473 . 
 72 .  [2008] EWHC 1252 (Comm); [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 991, [5]. 
 73 .  Ibid , [23]. 
 74 .  Ibid . 
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understood that the seller is unwilling or unable to perform the contract in due time, the 
buyer would have had the chance to notify its sub-buyers so that they could have started 
searching for alternatives with a reasonable amount of time, which could perhaps reduce 
the economic waste. This case strongly reinforces the suggestion that English contract law 
should introduce the doctrine of adequate assurance. 
 In a similar, controversial case,  Universal Cargo Carriers Corparation v Citati ,  75  the 
owner of a vessel was accused of wrongful termination of contract, despite the apparent 
repudiation by the charterer. In this case, the charterer was contractually obliged to furnish a 
cargo of 6,000 tons of scrap iron, to load it at the rate of 1,000 tons per day, and to complete 
the loading by 21 July. However, he failed to provide any cargo by 18 July. On this day, the 
owner terminated the contract by rechartering the vessel to another charterer, because the 
original charterer failed to provide any cargo three days before the lay days were due to 
expire under the charterparty.  76  The owner justifi ed this action by claiming that on or before 
18 July the charterer had committed an actual or anticipatory breach of its obligations under 
the charter. In other words, they believed that on that day 6,000 tons could not possibly 
have been loaded in the lay time remaining. The issue was then whether the charterer’s 
failure to load the goods on 18 July could lead to the reasonable inference that there would 
be prospective fundamental breach of contract. In other words, the question was whether it 
could be reasonably anticipated that the charterer would fail to perform its duties by the end 
of the lay days or within a reasonable time thereafter.  77  To convince the court, the shipowner 
had to show “that on July 18 the charterer was unable to load a cargo within such a time as 
would not have frustrated the venture”.  78  While it is well settled that the obligation to load 
within the lay days is a warranty and its breach gives rise to a claim for damages only,  79  the 
injured party is allowed to terminate if the delay becomes so prolonged that the breach is 
characterised so grave as to go to the root of the contract.  80  It was a question of fact to assess 
a period of delay to be suffi cient to constitute the frustration of charterparty as Devlin J 
opined that “an anticipatory breach must be proved in fact and not in supposition”.  81  The 
doctrine of adequate assurance could have shed light on the blurred factual situations of this 
case. If this doctrine were recognised in English law, the shipowner could use it to justify its 
termination of the contract because, although the charterer was willing to perform, it could 
not possibly load the goods until 18 July owing to the period of delay incurred. In other 
words, for the shipowner to be entitled to terminate the contract, it should have been sure 
that the charterer’s inability to perform was inexorable or suffi ciently probable. Failing to 
furnish an adequate assurance by the charterer would have led to a reasonable anticipation 
that the charterparty will not be performed, thus providing a strong ground for the owner 
rightfully to terminate the charterparty. 
 75 .  [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 17 ; [1957] 2 QB 401. 
 76 .  [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 17 , 19; [1957] 2 QB 401, 420. 
 77 .  [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 17 , 20; [1957] 2 QB 401, 440. 
 78 .  [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 17 , 23; [1957] 2 QB 401, 450. 
 79 .  Thorpe v Fasey [1949] Ch 649. 
 80 .  Evera S.A. Commercial v North Shipping Co. Ltd  [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 367 . See also Andrews, Clarke, 
Tettenborn & Virgo , Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination and Remedies , 2nd edn (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2017), 133. 
 81 .  [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 17 , 23; [1957] 2 QB 401, 450. See also  Forslind v Bechely-Crundall 1922 SC (HL) 
173, 192. 
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 In the more recent and similar case of  SK Shipping (S) Pte Ltd v  Petroexport Ltd (The Pro 
Victor) ,  82  the Commercial Court reached a different conclusion. In this case, SK Shipping 
chartered to Petreoexport for a voyage from Karachi, Pakistan carrying naphtha to Mailia, 
Taiwan. The charterparty provided that the vessel had to start loading by 27 August and 
the lay days were to last for three consecutive days. However, after the conclusion of the 
charterparty and before the vessel arrived in Karachi, the charterer faced some diffi culties 
both in securing suffi cient naphtha from its suppliers and fi nding a customer. As a result, 
the charterer ordered the vessel to slow steam. Furthermore, it never returned the copy 
of the charterparty sent by the owner for signature, which aimed at procuring freight text 
exemption. When the owner learned that the charterer experienced hardship in fi nding a 
buyer and might not proceed with the charterparty, it initiated a series of email exchanges 
to ascertain whether the charterer would perform the contract. In other words, the owner 
made several requests for confi rmation of performance by the charterer, but the requests 
were answered elusively.  83  Having received no persuasive confi rmation, the owner sent a 
fi nal email aiming at terminating the charterparty as a response to the charterer’s alleged 
renunciation. The Commercial Court upheld the owner’s decision to terminate the contract 
and recharter the vessel for another voyage on the basis that the charterer’s words and 
conduct gave rise to the renunciation of the charterparty. Although the Commercial Court 
ruled in favour of the owner, it was unpredictable as to whether the charterer’s conduct 
would lead to repudiation of performance, as indicated in its judgment that courts should 
take account of “the totality of the relevant words and conduct relied upon, in the light of 
all the circumstances, including the history of the contractual relationship”.  84  
 As shown above, the absence of the doctrine of adequate assurance in English law can 
lead to inconsistent decisions by courts in broadly factually similar cases, which ultimately 
impairs certainty with regard to future similar cases. These decisions clearly demonstrate 
that English contract law lacks an effective mechanism by which the suspicious party 
can draw the inference that a prospective non-performance or fundamental breach is 
likely, on the balance of probabilities, to materialise at the time for performance. Such 
inference would be particularly diffi cult in blurred situations where the promisor has 
behaved inconsistently, indicating that it lacks clearness of purpose or has insuffi cient 
understanding of business and markets which necessitate prompt and accurate compliance 
with obligations. The promisee should carry out an objective assessment as well as 
psychological operations within the mind of the promisor.  85  Lord Shaw of Dunfermline 
explains that, when there is likely to be prospective non-performance, “the accent of the 
psychology is not upon the mind of the person who is defi ant or heedless of his obligation” 
but rests on the mind of the person who is likely to suffer from the defi ance.  86  The doctrine 
of adequate assurance can therefore function to alleviate the position for the promisee, in 
 82 .  [2009] EWHC 2974 (Comm);  [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 158 . 
 83 .  Ibid , [30–38]. 
 84 .  Ibid , [88]. See also  Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v Bergbau-Handel GmbH (The Mihalis Angelos) 
[1971] 1 QB 164, 210;  [1970] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 43 ;  BS & N Ltd (BVI) v Micado Shipping Ltd (Malta) (The 
Seafl ower)  [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 37 . 
 85 .  Morris Carswell v Richard R. Collard (1893) 20 R (HL) 47; [1893] AC 635. 
 86 .  Forslind v Bechely-Crundall 1922 SC (HL) 173, 191. 
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that the failure by the promisor to provide the assurance will make it safer and hence more 
certain to terminate the contract.  87  
 The second justifi cation for the necessity of adequate assurance emanates from the 
policy of mitigation, which can provide a rigorous explanation. The mitigation policy 
under American contract law maintains that, when the promisee carries on performing 
after an apparent repudiation, but it is subsequently determined that an anticipatory breach 
took place, the promisee may not be able to obtain compensation for post-repudiation 
expenditures owing to his failure to avoid those expenses.  88  This would also lead to 
economic waste, because the promisee might have the ability to take reasonable steps to 
minimise the loss by avoiding the post-repudiation expenditures of performing his own 
contractual duties. In the signifi cant American case of  Rockingham County v Luten Bridge 
Co ,  89  after the company had started to construct a bridge, as agreed, the County repudiated 
the contract and instructed the company to stop work. Nevertheless, the company built the 
bridge and claimed the contract price. The court held that the company could not recover 
the contract price, and ruled that the duty to mitigate required the company to stop work, 
thereby restricting damages to the costs incurred up to the time of repudiation, as well 
as lost profi ts. The American rule  90  is not entirely similar to the rule adopted in English 
law; as demonstrated in the English case of  White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor ,  91  
however, the mitigation policy generally necessitates the doctrine of adequate assurance, 
which will be explained. 
 The strict view under English law holds that a claimant should not do nothing to 
minimise or avoid loss fl owing from a wrong; rather, it should use its resources to do 
what is reasonable to place itself in as good a fi nancial position as it would be in if the 
contract were performed or the tort not committed.  92  The mitigation principle aims at 
encouraging the claimant, once a wrong has occurred, to be reasonably self-reliant or, in 
economics terminology, to be effi cient, rather than ascribing all loss to the defendant.  93  
This analysis shows that it is not entirely clear whether the promisee’s duty to mitigate 
can be activated in blurred situations where the promisor behaves suspiciously with 
respect to the fulfi lment of its duties. The reason is that an apparent but yet unaccepted 
repudiation is a “thing writ in water and of no value to anybody”:  94  until accepted, it does 
not count as breach of contract which triggers the duty to mitigate. This was reiterated 
 87 .  The proposal to introduce the doctrine of adequate assurance was also put forward by Scottish Law 
Commission,  Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach of Contract (Sc LC 109, 1999), [9.2]. 
 88 .  WF Snyder, “Duty to mitigate upon anticipatory breach of forward contract of sale” (1949) Mich LR 
538, 540; MA Eisenberg, “Actual and Virtual Specifi c Performance, the Theory of Effi cient Breach, and the 
Indifference Principle in Contract Law” (2005) 93 Cal LR 975, 1023. 
 89 .  (1929) 22 III 35 F 2d 301. 
 90 .  For further explanations, see AG Dowling, “A Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance in All 
Transactions: UCC 2-609, Beyond Sales of Goods” (1975) 48 SCLR 1358, 1376–1380. 
 91 .  [1962] AC 413; [1962] SC (HL) 1. 
 92 .  Treitel , [20.115];  Chitty, [26.079]. See also  Thai Airways International Public Co Ltd v KI Holdings Co 
Ltd [2015] EWHC 1250 (Comm); [2016] 1 All ER (Comm) 675;  Hussey v Eels [1990] 2 QB 227;  Gebruder 
Metelmann GmbH & Co KG v NBR Ltd  [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 614 ;  British Westinghouse Electric Co Ltd v 
Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673. 
 93 .  A Burrows,  Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract , 3rd edn (OUP, 2004), 122. 
 94 .  Howard v  Pickford Tool Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 417, 421. See also  Frost v Knight (1872) LR 7 Ex 111; 
 Michael v Hart & Co [1902] 1 KB 482, 490;  Johnstone v Milling (1886) 16 QBD 460;  Heyman v Darwins Ltd 
[1942] AC 356;  Golding v London and Edinburgh Insurance Co Ltd (1932) 43 LI L Rep 487. 
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by McGregor, who explained that a buyer is not required to go into the market after 
anticipatory repudiation and “is entitled to sit back on a rising market”, as it “has no 
duty to mitigate”.  95  The landmark case of  White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v M’Gregor  96  
endorsed this reasoning, although it introduced new qualifi cations to the innocent party’s 
choice. In this case, a garage owner entered into a service contract by which an advertising 
company agreed to display advertisements for the respondent’s garage on local authority 
bins for a three-year period. However, the garage owner repudiated the contract several 
months prior to the commencement of performance. The advertising company refused to 
accept the cancellation and continued with performance of the contract. The garage owner 
then refused to pay for the advertisements, so the company sued for the full sum payable 
under the contract. The House of Lords ruled that the company was allowed to recover 
the price, holding that the rules of mitigation do not apply to the innocent party’s option: 
he may either accept the cancellation and treat it forthwith as a breach or he may continue 
to treat the contract as binding and fulfi l his duties, notwithstanding a repudiation by the 
other party.  97  
 Nevertheless, it can be argued that a contract institutionalises an economic and social 
relationship, in which legitimate self-interest is normative action followed by parties within 
a substantially cooperative structure, “of which mitigation is a fundamental pillar”.  98  This 
demonstrates that mitigation policy generally holds that reasonable steps should be taken 
to avoid or diminish loss when the repudiation is communicated.  99  The reason is that if this 
duty strictly arises only after the acceptance of repudiation, a corollary would be that the 
repudiatee is free to increase his potential losses by confi rming the contract and rendering 
unwanted performance.  100  Viscount Haldane LC, in  British Westinghouse Electric & 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v  Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd (No2) ,  101  
opined that promisees who fail to take reasonable steps to mitigate their loss should 
be unable to recover such loss as they reasonably could have avoided. The dissenting 
Lords Morton of Henryton and Keith of Avonholm in  White and Carter reasoned that the 
promisee was obliged to minimise its loss and that the promisor should have accepted 
the repudiation and looked for alternative customers who wanted their services.  102  In  The 
 95 .  H McGregor,  McGregor on Damages , 19th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 2012), [7.021], [20.017]; see now J 
Edelman, H McGregor,  McGregor on Damages , 20th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 2018), [9.015], [9.094]:  McGregor 
cites the numerous authorities that make it seem that the  ratio of  White and Carter actually applies to sales of 
goods. 
 96 .  [1962] AC 413; [1962] SC (HL) 1. 
 97 .  [1962] AC 413, 425; [1962] SC (HL) 1, 25; See also  Barclays Bank Plc v Unicredit Bank AG [2012] 
EWHC 3655 ; MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA 789;  [2016] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 494 ;  Chitty , [26.103]. For further clarifi cations, see J Morgan, “Smuggling Mitigation into  White & Carter 
v McGregor : Time to Come Clean?”  [2015] LMCLQ 575 , 576; JW Carter, “ White & Carter v McGregor —how 
unreasonable?” (2012) 128 LQR 490. 
 98 .  D Campbell, “Market Damages and the Invisible Hand” in L DiMatteo and M Hogg,  Comparative Contract 
Law, British and American Perspectives (OUP 2015), 340; see also D Campbell, “Relational Constitution of 
Remedies” (2005) 11 TWLR 455, 465. 
 99 .  See generally Morgan  [2013] LMCLQ 575 ; A Dyson and A Kramer, “There is no ‘breach date rule’: 
mitigation, difference in value and date of assessment” (2014) 130 LQR 259. 
 100 .  Liu, 567. 
 101 .  [1912] AC 673, 689. See A Dyson, “British Westinghouse Revisited” 2012] LMCLQ 412;  Hussey v 
 Eels  [1990] 2 QB 227, 232–233;  Hooper v Oates [2013] EWCA Civ 91; [2014] Ch 287. 
 102 .  [1962] AC 413, 433 (Lord Morton of Henryton), 435 (Lord Keith of Avonholm). 
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Golden Victory , Lord Bingham of Cornhill clarifi ed that mitigation imposes an assumption 
that the claimant acted reasonably, “whether in fact the [innocent party] acts in that way or, 
for whatever reason, does not”.  103  
 Lord Campbell CJ, in the signifi cant case of  Hochster v De La Tour ,  104  asserted that a 
function of the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract is to avoid any further loss to 
the promisee which may incur from his continued performance after repudiation. This 
indicates that anticipatory breach of contract can facilitate mitigation of potential loss. 
This is because it would be benefi cial for both parties, following the renunciation of the 
agreement by the party in breach, for the innocent party to have enough liberty to consider 
itself absolved from any future contractual duties and to seek similar goods or services from 
other suppliers. This is easy enough when the promisee is faced with unequivocal breach. 
If, however, the promisor behaves ambiguously, the promisee confronts a predicament. 
The promisee in this case would have to await either performance or unequivocal breach. 
This demonstrates that a reasonably suspicious and potentially injured promisee should 
be entitled to clarify this deadlock situation either to seek to execute its duty to mitigate 
following an unequivocal breach and accepting the breach, or to prepare itself to fulfi l 
its contractual obligation following its counterparty’s performance. In other words, 
to implement the mitigation duty, the promisee needs an effective means to ascertain 
whether a repudiation has occurred to prevent both additional pointless expenditures and 
performance past the time when enhanced losses begin to accrue. The doctrine of adequate 
assurance is a compelling mechanism for forcing the promisor to crystallise the situation. 
If the promisor provides an assurance which is adequately reasonable, the promisee 
becomes certain that the contract will be fulfi lled and that it does not need to take any 
other steps. But when the promisor declines to render an adequate assurance, it is a strong 
indication that the promisor will not perform the contract; thereby the promisee can accept 
the repudiation and should then actively attempt to reduce its loss to satisfy the mitigation 
requirement. The doctrine of adequate assurance is therefore capable of satisfying the goal 
of mitigation policy, in the sense that it can be used as an instrument to discover whether 
and when the promisee should begin its efforts to minimise the loss.  
 V. COMPATIBILITY OF ADEQUATE ASSURANCE 
WITH ENGLISH CONTRACT LAW 
 To verify whether adequate assurance fi ts neatly into English law, the nature of this doctrine 
should be taken into account. Adequate assurance has a promissory character, in the sense 
that the promisor pledges that its obligations will be fulfi lled in future.  105  Assurances may 
consist of new undertakings, taking, for example, the form of granting the insecure party 
the right to inspect the books of a suspect merchant to confi rm ongoing solvency.  106  To 
enforce the promisor’s undertaking to furnish adequate assurance, a serious objection may 
 103 .  Golden Strait Corp v Nippon Kaisen Kubishika Kaisha  [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 164 , 168; [2007] 2 AC 
353, 370. 
 104 .  (1853) 2 E & B 678, 690. 
 105 .  Ante , text between fnn 42–51. 
 106 .  Ibid . 
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arise from the rationale underlying the doctrine of consideration, as a complicated and 
multifarious body of rules aimed at limiting the enforceability of agreements in English 
law.  107  The doctrine of consideration is founded on the idea of reciprocity, indicating that 
“something of value in the eye of the law” must be provided in order for an enforceable 
contract to be constituted.  108  On this basis, adequate assurance may seem unlikely to be 
transplanted into English contract law, because this doctrine requires the promisor to 
provide something showing its intention regarding future performance without receiving 
anything in return from the promisee. As a result, the promisee obtains the benefi t of 
an assurance aimed at confi rming the future performance of the promise. However, this 
objection is unlikely to be serious enough to stall efforts at reforming the current status of 
the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract, for two independent reasons. 
 One reason lies in the nature of the anticipatory breach of contract. The striking 
entitlement of being able to invoke signifi cant remedies of damages and termination is 
justifi ed in Anglo-American law on the ground that there is an implied undertaking by 
both parties that, from the time they enter into the contract, neither party will renounce 
its duties.  109  Because the promisor impairs this implied undertaking by his conduct, he 
may wish to rectify the misunderstanding perceived by the promisee with respect to the 
fulfi lment of the contract. Communications concerning assurances encourage organic 
solidarity between the parties by ensuring that each remains committed to the contract.  110  
This should be emphasised in particular when commercial parties have maintained a long-
term relationship, and cooperative behaviour is reasonably expected from them to sustain 
that relationship.  111  The essence of this cooperative behaviour is to protect the promisee’s 
expectation interest, which is regarded as an important goal of contract remedies.  112  An 
appropriate course of action for eliminating or reducing that fatal misunderstanding 
originating from the promisor’s conduct is to grant an adequate assurance. In other words, 
the promisor, by providing an assurance, seeks to retrieve the trust broken by his apparently 
harmful conduct. This also demonstrates that adequate assurance has a relational character, 
enabling parties to preserve and advance their relationship. As shown in  Gulf Agri Trade , 
above, the seller failed to constructively react to the buyer’s legitimate concern, which 
stemmed from the seller’s failure to make any shipment by the end of September.  113  
This destructive behaviour could be amended by a convincing response from the seller 
indicating his willingness to perform the contract. Adequate assurance therefore simply 
seeks to clarify the situation and revert to the trust and confi dence originally established by 
the contract. This suggests that the promisee is not, therefore, required to offer a fi nancially 
valuable commitment in exchange for the assuring promise. However, it should be noted 
that this reasoning is compelling only when the promisor renders the weakest form of 
 107 .  Chitty , [4.001]. 
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 111 .  Campbell (2005) 11 TWLR 455, 456. 
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assurance: the mere affi rmation of one’s intention to perform his obligation under the 
contract, which can normally be made by an oral promise. 
 The second reason deals with more sophisticated situations where the assurance involves 
more robust, substantive promises than a mere verbal affi rmation of future performance, 
such as when the promisor furnishes a personal guaranty. It has been argued that perhaps 
consideration is rooted in the promisee’s forbearing from suspending its performance.  114  
However, it has been remained unanswered whether and how the forbearance is a benefi t to 
the promisor (“in that he may receive value”  115  ) or a detriment to the promisee (!in that he 
may give value”  116  ). At fi rst blush, forbearance is likely to confer benefi t to the promisor, 
in the sense that the promisee resumes performance of its contractual duties. According 
to the Offi cial Commentary to UCC, §2-609, “the essential purpose of a contract between 
commercial men is actual performance and they do not bargain merely for a promise”.  117  
It can also be argued that, when the promisee withholds performance of contract, he is 
likely to embark a lawsuit against the promisor in due course, and furnishing adequate 
assurance induces the promisee to forbear from pursuing his claim.  118  Nevertheless, the 
extent to which such forbearances confer benefi t on the promisor or incur detriment to the 
promisee cannot be easily determined. In other words, there might be situations where it 
is pointless to “imprison two parties in a long-term contract where there is absence of trust 
or the prospect of mounting, incremental losses”, and that termination of contract is more 
benefi cial for both parties.  119  
 While this paper does not discount the importance of forbearance in satisfying 
consideration requirement, it intends to look at this issue from another perspective. As 
shown above, the promisor enjoys freedom in granting an adequate assurance. When the 
promisor is faced with a demand for adequate assurance, it has presumably had the chance 
to engage in a cost-benefi t analysis following the conclusion of contract, in that it is able to 
evaluate the costs of full performance of the contract versus paying damages in the event of 
repudiation due to new circumstances in the market. In other words, the promisor’s decision 
is likely to be informed by an assessment of whether it declines to provide an assurance, 
thus entitling the promisee to terminate the contract, as a result of which the former should 
pay damages to the latter. These costs could potentially be increased by the usual costs of 
concluding a new transaction with another party, especially when a commercial promisor is 
in urgent need of supplying its sub-buyers or other associated parties.  120  On the other hand, 
when the promisor positively responds to the promisee’s request by providing assurance 
to the effect of continuation of contract, thereby forcing the promisee to forbear from 
 114 .  MJ Borden, “The Promissory Character of Adequate Assurances of Performance”  (2010) 76 BLR 
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suspension, the promisor should have been convinced that the costs of contract performance 
do not outweigh the costs of non-performance, ie, paying damages. This cost-benefi t 
analysis conducted by the promisor shows that providing or declining to afford an adequate 
assurance confers in return a commercial advantage to it. This commercial advantage is the 
opportunity to operate an assessment of transaction costs in the interim between the times 
of conclusion and performance of a contract. This can constitute a good consideration, 
according to Kitchin LJ in the recent case of  MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock 
Advertising Ltd ,  121  since a practical benefi t which offers a clear commercial advantage to 
the promisor is suffi cient for enforcing a modifi cation or variation promise. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the lack of consideration moving from the promisee, the benefi t to the 
promisor resulting from his opportunity to conduct a fi nancial assessment is capable of 
constituting good consideration for the promise to afford adequate assurance. 
 Another potential objection may arise from the absence of the doctrine of withholding 
performance under English law. Under the doctrine of adequate assurance, the suspicious 
promisee is entitled to withhold its performance and request an adequate assurance from 
the promisor showing its ability and willingness to perform. The problem would be that, 
if the promisee withholds its performance to achieve an adequate assurance, it itself may 
be suspected of breaching the contract, entitling the promisor to terminate. In other words, 
the promisee may be accused of unwillingness or inability to fulfi l its contractual duties, 
and thus the suspension of performance may not be justifi ed. Furthermore, withholding 
performance may not be justifi ed here, because the promisee is demanding the action of 
giving assurance, which is in addition to what was agreed under the contract, thus the 
promisor is not obliged to provide this assurance. However, there are two reasons which 
would allow the promisee to suspend its performance. 
 First, while suspension of performance  per se is not recognised as a remedy in English 
law,  122  the traditional English law remedies of stoppage in transit and right to lien carry with 
themselves a form of modifi cation of contract along with suspension. These two remedies 
can be invoked when the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, at which point the 
buyer is entitled to dispose of them and pass title to a third party.  123  These remedies are 
normally invoked in situations where the buyer has fallen into insolvency or the goods 
have been sold on credit but the term of credit has expired.  124  The right to stoppage in 
transit was fi rst reported in  Wiseman v Vandeputt ,  125  where it was held that on the condition 
that a buyer becomes a bankrupt before the goods arrive, the seller “can by any means 
prevent the goods coming into the hands of the buyer”. The purpose of this doctrine is 
essentially to prevent the seller’s goods from being thrown into the mass of an insolvent 
state, thus leaving it to wait for a dividend with the creditors in general.  126  By stopping the 
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goods in the course of their transit, the seller obliges the carrier to redeliver the goods to 
it, and thereby reacquires the possession of the goods. The justifi cation proposed for this 
right is that the seller’s delivery of the goods is only a conditional delivery of possession 
to the buyer, provided that the latter remains solvent up to the time he acquires actual 
possession of the goods from the carrier.  127  This right is believed to be derived from the 
customs of merchants, and given its manifest justice and utility, was formally introduced 
into the common law of England by the House of Lords in 1793 in  Lickbarrow v Mason .  128  
This common law doctrine was ultimately codifi ed in Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.44. 
 The right to lien is derived from general usage and usually exists as a common law right, 
which is conceived to be a “passive right of retention that be exercised by the members of 
certain professions or callings against the owner where the lienee acquires possession of 
goods with the actual or apparent consent of the owner”.  129  The seller’s right to lien was 
fi rst defi ned in the nineteenth century, as a “right in one man to retain that which is in his 
possession belonging to another, till certain demands of him the person in possession are 
satisfi ed”.  130  This right can now be applied in the precise circumstances enumerated by the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.41. This right therefore allows the seller to suspend the contract 
by retaining the goods until the buyer pays or tenders the whole of the price.  131  
 These two common law rights consolidated in the sale of Goods Act 1979 demonstrate 
that the right to withhold performance is no stranger to English common law and that the 
seller is entitled to avoid delivering the goods in circumstances where there are serious 
doubts regarding the buyer’s ability or willingness to tender payment. Halting delivery of 
the goods would force the buyer to clarify the situation by either tendering the whole of 
the price or clearly expressing his inability to perform, and subsequent outcomes will be 
followed. 
 Furthermore, if the promisee feels insecure about the promisor’s ability or willingness to 
perform the contract in future on the basis of reasonable grounds, it is allowed to suspend 
its performance without fear of conducting a breach. This can be explained by reference 
to the doctrine of “fundamental breach”. Fundamental or material breach is characterised 
as a breach that deprives the claimant of substantially the whole of the benefi t for which 
he bargained.  132  However, the House of Lords ruled that the principle of fundamental 
breach does not constitute a rule of law.  133  Lord Reid stated that “general use of the term 
fundamental breach is of recent origin, and I can fi nd nothing to indicate that it means 
either more or less that the well-known type of breach which entitles the innocent party to 
treat as repudiatory and to rescind the contract”.  134  Although the doctrine was ruled out by 
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the House of Lords, the understanding behind it still exists in English law, as it has been 
indicated that “the general principle is that any [defi ciency in quality or quantity] must 
attain a certain minimum degree of seriousness to entitle the injured party to terminate”.  135  
In other words, “the [promisor] must have been guilty of a substantial failure to perform”.  136  
On this basis, withholding performance does not constitute fundamental breach of contract. 
The promisee’s suspension of performance does not fundamentally impair the promisor’s 
ability to perform.  137  The former temporarily discontinues performance under the contract, 
and seeks to force the promisor to clarify the deadlock situation. The promisee’s action 
is a legitimate strategic behaviour aiming at shifting the burden towards the promisor, so 
that the latter can decide whether to continue with the contract by providing adequate 
assurance or decline the request and entitle the promisee to terminate. Accordingly, not 
only does the promisee’s action not seek to reinforce the essential purpose of a commercial 
contract, which is the actual performance, but also nor does it either undermine or frustrate 
the commercial purpose of a contract. This Part has demonstrated that the promisee would 
not face any serious objection from English law when it suspends performance following 
a request for adequate assurance from the promisor. 
 VI. RECOMMENDATION FOR LEGISLATION 
 The previous Parts of this article attempted to argue that the doctrine of adequate 
assurance, as a useful mechanism, can be invoked freely by commercial parties without 
any serious objections derived from common law and that the courts are encouraged to 
recognise and welcome this doctrine. Nevertheless, the much-anticipated question is 
whether this doctrine should be formally introduced through legislation. As argued above, 
at English common law, one party to a contract may suffer considerable and justifi able 
anxiety concerning the other party’s willingness or ability to perform and yet have no 
legal ground for invoking any remedies. The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract 
under English law fails to provide any protection for the party enduring reasonable doubts. 
It is worth noting that the Scottish Law Commission initially in 1999 put forward the 
proposal as to whether there is a need formally to introduce the doctrine of adequate 
assurance through legislation. The idea was to alleviate the uncertain position for the 
aggrieved party by demanding an assurance of due performance from the other party and 
that failure to provide the assurance will make it safer to terminate.  138  The proposal asked 
the consultees to consider a provision establishing the doctrine of adequate assurance. 
Although most of the respondents agreed with the proposal, there was an observation 
that such assurances could already be requested informally and introducing this doctrine 
would create more uncertainty.  139  It was also contended that withholding performance 
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by the insecure party would likely be recognised by the courts in situations where it 
awaits the response to the demand for adequate assurance on the basis of reasonable 
doubts that fundamental non-performance will be occurred by the promisor.  140  This view 
concurs with our previous argument that withholding performance by the insecure party 
does not imperil the promisor’s expectations and should not be viewed as an avenue for 
fundamental breach.  141  However, the Commission made no recommendation concerning 
legislating this doctrine in 1999. Nevertheless, the Commission very recently in July 2017 
reviewed the need and desirability of introducing the doctrine of adequate assurance into 
a legal provision in light of the decision made in  GL Group Plc v Ash .  142  In this case, AG 
had some doubts concerning GL’s ability to pay in exchange for the services provided 
under a contract and thus sought immediate payment of the value of work rendered to date 
and payment in advance for future work. AG threatened GL by stating that they “would 
have no alternative but to resile from the contract” if GL declined to make payment by a 
certain deadline.  143  The court found AG to have wrongfully repudiated the contract and 
held that damages should be provided to GL. While the Commission agreed with the 
decision, they maintained that “it might have been helpful had the law provided a means 
of seeking or obtaining assurances of performance from GL while withholding AG’s own 
performance”.  144  Having enabled the creditor to request for adequate assurance would also 
mean that the debtor could resile “what might otherwise amount to anticipated breach”.  145  
Termination will therefore become plausible only when the debtor declines to reply to a 
demand for assurance of performance. In light of these arguments, the Commission has 
asked consultees on whether a legal provision should formally prescribe the doctrine of 
adequate assurance. The formal proposal will be published in 2018.  146  
 This article recommends that the English and Welsh Law Commission should consider 
the proposal to the effect that the doctrine of adequate assurance be formally recognised 
in English contract law, and be preferably introduced as a new section into the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979. The proposed section would read: “a party who has reasonable grounds 
for insecurity regarding the other party’s ability or willingness to perform may demand an 
adequate assurance of due performance, and until it receives the assurance may suspend 
any performance for which it has not already received the agreed return”. This proposed 
section serves several purposes. First, it seeks to tackle and cover the loophole in the 
doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract in the sense that it will formally be prescribed 
that an insecure party is entitled to apply the mechanism of adequate assurance in order to 
clarify dubious circumstances it is facing. In line with the pragmatist approach favoured in 
English law,  147  the suggested section does not intend to be abstract or general. Rather, this 
principle seeks to address the specifi c problems arisen from the application of anticipatory 
breach of contract. The provision thus provides an instrument protecting the insecure party 
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and striking a right balance between competing interests of contracting parties. Second, 
this principle is likely to give some overall structure or rational shape to the law concerning 
anticipatory breach of contract, thus satisfying not only the interest of elegance, but the 
interest of consistency and complying with the ambition to ensure that like is treated 
alike. It may, however, be argued that the suggested section entails a number of vague 
terms such as “reasonable grounds”, which may collide with the interests of certainty 
and predictability in a commercial transaction. As explained previously, ambiguities of 
those terms can be reduced by taking account of relevant business practices and important 
factors associated with the particular transaction at hand, which may lead to the organic 
growth of this area of law by encouraging the courts to interpret and implement the general 
policies aligned with business practices.  148  Third, this recommended section overcomes 
the aforementioned objections and diffi culties that may arise from common law.  149  As 
such, judges, legal practitioners and commercial parties are able to recognise and utilise 
this doctrine with no concerns as to whether this doctrine is compatible or harmonious 
with common law rules, like the doctrine of consideration. 
 VII. CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this article was to explore whether the doctrine of adequate assurance, 
introduced by Llewellyn in UCC, Art.2 should be adopted into English contract law. 
Although the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract originated in English law, no 
modifi cations have been implemented to meet the reasonable expectations of commercial 
parties, namely certainty and predictability. An anticipatory breach of contract should be 
objectively inferred by taking account of the totality of the relevant words and conduct 
relied upon, in light of all of the circumstances, including the history of the contractual 
relationship.  150  The promisee may misjudge whether repudiation amounts to an actual 
breach, partly because the promisor has shown inconsistent behaviours by not performing 
comparable contracts or because the promisor has fallen into insolvency. 
 The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract, as it currently stands in English 
contract law, fails to provide a solution for a promisee confronting uncertain and dubious 
circumstances, since it lacks a solid instrument to determine objectively whether the 
promisor will perform the contract. To extricate itself effectively from the risks and 
uncertainties involved in relying on anticipatory breach of contract, the promisee can invoke 
the doctrine of adequate assurance as an avenue for the detection of breach. To justify the 
necessity of this doctrine, this article examined the signifi cant hypothesis that adequate 
assurance is a logical corollary of the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract. Because 
the latter doctrine is utilised only when a purported repudiation occurs with utmost clarity, 
it is diffi cult for the promisee to meet this requirement in situations where promisors exhibit 
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inconsistent conduct. In such situations, the doctrine of adequate assurance can be applied 
to determine with suffi cient certainty whether the promisor intends and is able to perform 
the contract. This doctrine was also justifi ed by the mitigation policy. Although the scope 
of the promisee’s duty to mitigate under English law is slightly narrower than in American 
law, it can be stated that mitigation policy generally supports the view that reasonable 
steps should be taken to avoid or diminish loss. In equivocal and dubious circumstances, 
the promisee is unlikely to realise when it is required to take reasonable steps to diminish 
loss. To implement the duty to mitigate effectively, the doctrine of adequate assurance as a 
compelling procedure forces the promisor to crystallise the situation, ascertaining whether 
or not a given behaviour is in fact repudiatory. 
 The article subsequently examined the compatibility of this doctrine with English 
contract law. The most robust objection may arise from the doctrine of consideration, 
due to the new undertakings that may be rendered by the promisor, without receiving 
anything of value in return. This view can be refuted by arguing that consideration can be 
found in the promisee’s forbearing from suspension of performance. Another argument 
would be that by furnishing an adequate assurance and hence persuading the promisee 
to carry on the contract, the promisor is satisfi ed that the costs of contract performance 
do not outweigh the costs of non-performance, namely paying damages. The promisor 
will have had the chance to carry out a cost-benefi t analysis with regard to performance 
or non-performance of the contract. This assessment of costs in the duration between 
conclusion and performance of the contract is indeed a commercial advantage, which can 
constitute good consideration. Another potential objection may originate from the absence 
of the doctrine of withholding performance under English law. The doctrine of adequate 
assurance allows the suspicious party to withhold its performance after demanding an 
assurance. Two reasons can be given to invalidate this objection. First, the suspension of 
performance comprises an important stage of traditional English law remedies of stoppage 
in transit and right to lien. These remedies carry with themselves a form of modifi cation of 
contract along with suspension. Second, the doctrine of “fundamental breach” of contract 
allows the promisee to suspend its performance without being accused of a breach, thus 
entitling the promisor to terminate the contract. The promisee would not therefore face any 
restrictions so long as the suspension of performance does not substantially endanger the 
promisor’s ability to perform. While no serious objections concerning the application of 
the doctrine of adequate assurance may arise from common law, it is recommended that 
the English and Welsh Law Commission consider the proposal formally prescribing the 
doctrine of adequate assurance and introducing it as a new section into the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979. The proposed section would read: “a party who has reasonable grounds for 
insecurity regarding the other party’s ability or willingness to perform may demand an 
adequate assurance of due performance, and until it receives the assurance may suspend 
any performance for which it has not already received the agreed return”. This section not 
only enhances the situation of the insecure party and strikes a reasonable balance between 
competing interests of contractual parties; it also improves this particular area of English 
contract law by reducing its uncertainty through an accessible legislative statement. 
